


Date

7 July 64

From Sherman Kent

To: Mr McCone

This is the memo I spoke of  
this morning.



has seen it.

His only comment was to the  
effect that it seemed a little  
"pro Turk" — which I should  
guess was par as from the US  
Ambassador to Athens.  
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Executive Registry

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7 July 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: New Dangers in the Cyprus Dispute

Both Athens and the Greek Cypriots appear to be increasingly acting on the assumption that the battle is virtually won and that they will emerge victorious. Athens and those Greek Cypriots who favor enosis appear to be following a two-pronged strategy of building up their forces on Cyprus (1) to establish control over President Makarios and to ensure the eventual triumph of enosis -- which they doubt Makarios really supports -- and (2) to be sufficiently strong to contain any Turkish invasion of the island until UN and Western intervention might stop the conflict. Thus in recent weeks they have taken several actions that run a serious risk of provoking a vigorous Turkish response.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. The return of Greek resistance leader Grivas on 12 June 1964 was followed almost immediately by a large influx of personnel from Greece. This inflow of some 5,000 to 7,000 armed men includes some Greek Cypriot students trained by the Greek military. However, most of them probably are regular Greek troops, including an artillery unit. Efforts by the Greek Cypriots to prevent the UN from identifying these arrivals have only heightened the mystery of their intentions without

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downgrading and  
declassification

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effectively concealing the fact of their presence from any of the parties concerned. Whatever the exact mixture of these forces, however, it is clear that the Greeks have been engaging in a de facto intervention on Cyprus.

2. This inflow from Greece increases the already overwhelming Greek Cypriot military superiority over the Turkish Cypriots, and raises the level of tension on the island and between Greece and Turkey.

25X6

[REDACTED] both  
forces are located in the same area of the island, further increasing the possibility of clashes. More important, in time this Greek military intervention could significantly affect the ability of the Turks to carry out a successful military invasion from Turkey. Up to now the Turks in agreeing to postpone their intervention have taken solace in their capability to seize the island at will. Any change in this comforting appraisal would almost certainly revive pressures inside Turkey to reconsider military action "before it is too late." Already Turkish propaganda is raising the spectre of intervention to cope with this influx of Greeks, particularly if Greece should continue to refuse to undertake meaningful negotiations.

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3. Moreover, the Turks are generally still smarting from the strong US measures used to block their own intervention plans in June. Indeed, if Inonu does not succeed in securing US action against these Greek moves, his position in parliament and vis-a-vis the military may be severely undermined, with the serious danger that he would lose control of the government. In these circumstances, US-Turkish relations are apt to suffer considerable damage.

4. Another development which threatens the present tenuous equilibrium is the harassment of the Turkish contingent. Periodically the contingent's water supply has been cut off, and President Makarios has previously threatened to stop off all supplies from reaching the unit in the future. The contingent has not yet received permission to receive its regular monthly June shipment of supplies from Turkey on which it depends. While this Turkish unit still has sufficient stocks of essentials to operate until toward the end of July, it would be in a critical position thereafter if not resupplied. Ankara has indicated that if the Greek Cypriots do not give way on this issue, the contingent will use force to open its supply lines. Any such fracas involving the Turkish contingent would strongly increase the possibility of direct intervention from Ankara.

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5. In addition, some Greek buildup on Rhodes has been reported. Although these reports are not supported by evidence available to us, to the extent that the Turks come to believe them, tension between Turkey and Greece will further increase.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



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SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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7 July 1964

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Comments on NSC Paper re Cyprus

1. We believe on the basis of [REDACTED] the events of early June that an invasion of Cyprus could be mounted in three to four days after the decision to intervene was taken. The NSC paper refers to one week.

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[REDACTED]

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3. One of the most important results of Inonu's visits to Washington and London is his realization that the U. S. and U. K. regard the 1959 treaties as still valid -- including the right of intervention granted Turkey.

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4. On the basis of the present situation and prospects the odds of Turkish intervention in Cyprus might fairly be quoted as 50-50. Both sides are building up their capabilities, tensions between them are rising, and internal pressures are growing in both Greece and Turkey; hence, the longer a settlement is delayed, the greater the chance of an outbreak of hostilities. So far, the US, while urging negotiations, has scrupulously avoided suggestions as to the substance of a settlement; we believe that at this point the chances of settlement would be improved if the US were to indicate to Turkey and Greece its notions concerning the substance of an equitable and viable solution.

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